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Abstract	
After	the	death	of	Thomas	Kelly	(2012)	and	Daniel	Christie	(2013)	in	Sydney,	New	South	
Wales	(NSW),	there	was	widespread	discussion	and	concern	over	the	problem	of	so‐called	
one	punch	alcohol‐fuelled	violence.	A	‘centre‐piece’	of	the	NSW	Government’s	response	was	
the	enactment,	in	January	2014,	of	what	is	known	colloquially	as	the	‘One	Punch	Law’:	the	
Crimes	and	Other	Legislation	Amendment	(Assault	and	Intoxication)	Act	2014	(NSW),	which	
includes	a	mandatory	minimum	sentence	for	assault	causing	death	whilst	intoxicated.	This	
paper	analyses	the	judicial	response	to	one	punch	alcohol‐fuelled	violence,	with	a	focus	on	
the	effect	of	the	decision	in	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120.	I	show	that	the	judiciary	has	
rejected	the	existence	of	a	discrete	category	of	‘one	punch’	manslaughters	and,	instead,	has	
defined	a	category	of	alcohol‐fuelled	public	violence	 for	which	there	is	a	strong	need	for	
general	deterrence.	Based	on	an	analysis	of	 cases	handed	down	since	 the	NSW	Court	of	
Criminal	Appeal’s	2014	decision,	I	show	that	the	‘Loveridge	effect’	has	been	to	significantly	
increase	sentences	in	such	matters.	
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Introduction	
In	recent	years,	the	relationship	between	alcohol	and	violence	has	been	prominent	on	the	main	
stage	of	public	policy	debate	in	Australia.	‘One	punch’	fatalities—although	rare	in	the	context	of	
the	many	thousands	of	assaults	that	occur	every	year—have	become	a	focal	point	for	calls	for	a	
more	 punitive	 response	 from	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Much	 of	 the	 attention	 to	 date	 has	
focused	 on	 the	 response	 of	 the	 legislature	 to	 growing	 anxiety	 over	 ‘alcohol‐fuelled’	 violence,	
specifically,	the	addition	of	a	new	homicide	offence	in	s	25A	of	the	Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW)	and	
changes	to	the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW),	which	introduced	a	special	rule	for	
self‐induced	intoxication	in	s	21A(5AA)	(see	also	Quilter	2014a).	Aside	from	trenchant	criticism	
of	 the	 original	 sentencing	 decision	 in	 R	 v	 Loveridge	 [2013]	 NSWSC	 1638,	 considerably	 less	
attention	has	been	paid	to	the	response	of	the	judiciary	to	alcohol‐related	violence.	This	article	
seeks	to	fill	that	gap.	Courts	play	an	important	role	in	shaping	the	contours	of	the	criminal	law,	
and	their	actions	deserve	scrutiny,	credit	and	criticism	 in	 the	same	way	as	 legislative	actions.	
Based	 primarily	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 2014	 decision	 of	 the	 NSW	 Court	 of	 Criminal	 Appeal	
(NSWCCA)	in	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120,	and	sentencing	decisions	made	subsequently,	
this	article	argues	that,	although	the	judicial	response	has	been	less	visible,	to	date	it	has	produced	
more	 significant	 changes	 in	 the	 criminal	 law’s	 treatment	 of	 violent,	 alcohol‐fuelled	 criminal	
behaviour	than	the	changes	made	by	the	NSW	Parliament.	
	
The	primary	 assertion	 of	 this	 article	 is	 that,	 contrary	 to	 the	 commonly	made	 claim	by	media	
commentators	and	politicians	that	judges	are	‘out	of	touch’	with,	and	unresponsive	to,	community	
sentiment	 on	 the	 seriousness	 of	 alcohol‐related	 violence,	 there	 is	 strong	 evidence	 that	 the	
NSWCCA	has	actively	recalibrated	the	‘correct’	approach	to	sentencing	in	such	cases,	and	that	this	
has	yielded	 significantly	 increased	sentences.	The	Court	has	 effected	 this	 change	via	a	 careful	
doctrinal	redesign	which	has	involved	simultaneously	rejecting	the	existence	of	a	category	of	one	
punch	manslaughter	and	any	suggestion	of	a	sentencing	range	for	such	offences.	In	its	place	the	
Court	has	created	a	new	category	of	alcohol‐related	street	violence—what	I	term	the	‘Loveridge	
category’.	 This	 category,	 although	 crafted	 through	 the	 dispassionate	 language	 of	 sentencing	
principles,	has	many	of	the	hallmarks	(and	tropes)	that	dominated	media	and	political	discourse	
on	the	crisis	of	public	alcohol‐related	violence	in	the	period	after	the	one	punch	deaths	of	Thomas	
Kelly	 (July	 2012)	 and	 Daniel	 Christie	 (December	 2013)	 through	 to,	 and	 beyond,	 the	 2014	
enactment	of	the	new	offence	of	assault	causing	death.	It	is	important	that	these	events	not	be	
seen	in	isolation	or	as	unique	to	the	problem	of	one	punch	violence,	but	as	an	episode	in	the	longer	
struggle	between	the	executive/legislative	arms	of	government	and	the	judiciary	over	control	of	
sentencing.2	The	 central	 theme	 in	 the	 story	 told	 in	 this	 article	 is	 of	 the	 reassertion	 of	 judicial	
authority	over	punishment.	However,	contrary	to	the	assumption	that	judges	routinely	work	to	
mitigate	legislative	excess	 in	this	context	(for	example,	Muldrock	v	The	Queen	 (2011)	244	CLR	
120),	the	‘Loveridge	effect’—a	product	of	judicial	action—has	involved	increased	punitiveness	in	
sentencing	in	the	form	of	significantly	longer	prison	terms.3	
	
In	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	 article	 I	 provide	 an	 overview	of	 the	 events	 that	 propelled	 	 one	punch	
fatalities	 into	 the	 media	 headlines	 and	 triggered	 a	 fast	 and	 punitive	 response	 by	 the	 NSW	
Parliament.	I	also	introduce	a	tension	that	was	already	present	in	the	judiciary’s	handling	of	such	
cases,	including	how	best	to	characterise	the	seriousness	of	one	punch	killings	and	to	condemn	
and	deter	alcohol‐related	violence.	In	the	second	part	I	describe	and	analyse	what,	I	argue,	has	
proved	 to	 be	 a	pivotal	 decision	 in	 recalibrating	 the	 approach	 to	 sentencing	offenders	 in	 such	
cases:	 the	decision	of	 the	NSWCCA	in	R	v	Loveridge	[2014].	 I	next	describe	 the	creation	of	 the	
Loveridge	category.	The	fourth	part	discusses	the	judicial	uptake	of	the	principles	espoused	by	
the	NSWCCA	in	Loveridge,	including	recognition	that	it	represents	a	significant	shift	in	sentencing	
principles	 as	well	 as	 attempts	 to	 identify	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 category	 which	 it	 created.	 This	 is	
followed	by	an	analysis	of	nine	sentencing	decisions	handed	down	after	Loveridge	in	which	the	
court	was	required	to	formulate	a	sentence	in	a	case	that	fell	within	the	Loveridge	category.	I	show	
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that	the	Loveridge	effect	has	produced	a	significant	increase	in	head	sentences	and	non‐parole	
periods	for	alcohol‐related	public	violence.		
	
Background	
The	death	of	Thomas	Kelly	in	July	2012	in	Kings	Cross	was	the	catalyst	for	a	strong	media	and	
community	campaign	in	relation	to	alcohol‐fuelled	violence,	with	a	particular	focus	on	random	
unprovoked	one	punch	fatal	violence	(Quilter	2013).	This	campaign	put	significant	pressure	on	
the	 then	 NSW	 Government	 to	 respond	 with	 new	 measures	 (Quilter	 2015b).	 Adding	 to	 the	
pressure	on	the	Government	was	community	unrest	over	what	was	perceived	to	be	an	inadequate	
sentence	handed	down	to	Kieran	Loveridge	for	the	manslaughter	of	Kelly.	The	sentence,	handed	
down	by	Justice	Campbell	on	8	November	2013,	was	for	a	total	of	7	years	and	2	months	for	the	
combined	manslaughter	and	four	assaults	(6	years	for	manslaughter	with	a	4‐year	non‐parole	
period	(NPP),	and	1	year	and	2	months	for	the	assaults),	with	an	effective	total	NPP	of	5	years	and	
2	months.	 The	 sentence	was	widely	 criticised	 as	 too	 low	 (‘4	 years	 for	 a	 life’)	 and	 as	 further	
evidence	that	the	judiciary	was	‘out	of	touch’	and	inclined	to	be	inconsistent	and	unduly	lenient	
in	sentencing	violent	offenders.	And	yet,	as	shown	in	previous	research,	at	the	time	Campbell	J	
sentenced	Loveridge,	his	Honour’s	approach	was	not	grossly	at	odds	with	prevailing	sentencing	
principles	 and	 practice	 regarding	 one	 punch	 fatalities	 (Quilter	 2014b).	 The	 charge	 of	
‘inconsistency’	stuck,	however,	and	the	foundation	for	NSWCCA	intervention	was	established.	It	
might	be	argued	that	consistency	is	only	desirable	in	political	discourse	if	it	connotes	consistently	
high	 sentences	 that	 are	 in	 sync	with	prevailing	 ‘penal	 ideologies’	 (Henham	2012;	 Loader	 and	
Sparks	2016).	
	
Following	another	serious	one	punch	assault	(of	23‐year‐old	Michael	McEwen,	at	Bondi	Beach,	
Sydney,	on	14	December	2013,	which	put	him	in	a	coma	for	a	week)	and	a	one	punch	assault	on	
New	Year’s	Eve	that	ultimately	led	to	the	death	of	18‐year‐old	Daniel	Christie,	Sydney’s	two	daily	
newspapers	 ran	major	 campaigns	 in	 relation	 to	 alcohol‐fuelled	 violence.	The	 Sydney	Morning	
Herald	 revived	 the	 ‘Safer	 Sydney’	 campaign	 it	 had	 initiated	 after	 Mr	 Kelly’s	 death,	 and	 The	
Telegraph	ran	the	‘Enough’	campaign	(Quilter	2015b).	
	
Legislative	response	
Within	 this	 context,	 the	 Government	 was	 under	 enormous	 pressure	 to	 respond	 to	 so‐called	
alcohol‐fuelled	one	punch	violence—particularly,	in	light	of	what	was	perceived	to	be	the	failure	
of	 the	 courts	 to	 deliver	 on	 a	 just	 sentence	 (see	Quilter	 2014a).	 On	21	 January	2014	 the	 then	
Premier	(O’Farrell)	announced	his	16‐point	plan	to	tackle	drug	and	alcohol	violence.	Only	a	week	
later,	 on	 30	 January	 2014,	 the	 NSW	 Parliament	 enacted	 the	 Crimes	 and	 Other	 Legislation	
Amendment	(Assault	and	Intoxication)	Act	2014	(NSW)	(the	Act)—colloquially	known	as	the	One	
Punch	 Law.	 The	 Act,	 inter	 alia,	 amended	 the	 Crimes	Act	 1900	 (NSW)	 to	 add	 a	 third	 discrete	
category	of	homicide,	alongside	murder	and	manslaughter	in	Pt	3,	Div	1	‘Homicide’.	Section	25A	
provides	for	an	offence	of	‘assault	causing	death’	and	an	aggravated	version	of	that	offence	where	
the	offender	is	intoxicated	at	the	time	of	committing	the	offence.	Notably,	the	aggravated	offence	
under	s	25B	carries	a	mandatory	minimum	sentence	of	8	years	imprisonment.	This	was	only	the	
second	 time	 in	 recent	 NSW	 history	 that	 a	 mandatory	 minimum	 sentence	 (MMS)	 has	 been	
introduced.4		
	
Elsewhere	 I	 have	 discussed	 the	 poor	 drafting	 of	 this	 legislation	 and	 the	 adverse	 legal	 and	
operational	implications	(Quilter	2014a,	2015a).	Here	I	note	that	there	is	a	significant	disconnect	
between	the	‘solution’	produced	by	the	Act—that	is,	a	new	offence	of	‘assault	causing	death’—
and	the	 ‘problem’	which	motivated	 the	 legislation.	The	dissatisfaction	 in	 the	Loveridge	matter	
focused	on	the	adequacy	of	the	sentence	he	received,	not	the	suitability	or	availability	of	offences.	
Among	other	things,	the	Act	was	unquestionably	a	vote	of	 ‘no	confidence’	 in	the	judiciary.	The	
MMS	attaching	to	the	aggravated	offence—which	clearly	fetters	judicial	discretion—is	the	most	
obvious	example	of	this	sentiment.		
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To	date,	one	person	(Hugh	Garth)	has	been	convicted	of	the	aggravated	offence,	on	1	June	2017.	
At	the	time	of	writing,	he	 is	yet	to	be	sentenced	for	that	offence.	Four	other	people	have	been	
charged	under	the	new	law	(Office	of	the	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions,	correspondence	with	
author,	 26	 October	 2016).	 Of	 these	matters,	 two	 relate	 to	 s	 25A(1)	 (with	 one	matter	 having																	
s	25A(1)	as	the	principal	offence	and	another	as	an	alternative	to	manslaughter)	and	two	involve	
s	25A(2).	In	another	matter,	R	v	Johnson,	s	25A(2)	was	charged	in	the	alternative	to	murder	and	
manslaughter,	however,	on	19	May	2017	a	jury	convicted	Mr	Johnson	of	manslaughter.5	It	is	too	
early	to	conclude	what	effect	the	new	offences	may	have	on	sentencing	outcomes.	As	I	show	in	
this	article	(see	the	discussion	on	the	impact	of	the	Loveridge	effect	on	sentences),	while	the	new	
offences,	including	the	MMS,	were	clearly	part	of	the	Legislature’s	‘solution’	to	the	suggestion	that	
the	courts	could	not	be	trusted	to	do	the	right	thing,	to	date	it	has	been	the	self‐initiated	moves	
made	by	the	judiciary	that	have	had	a	greater	effect	on	increasing	sentences.		
	
The	Act	also	introduced	a	‘special	rule’	into	s	21A	of	the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	
(NSW)	that	self‐induced	intoxication	cannot	be	a	mitigating	factor	on	sentence:	
	
(5AA)	Special	rule	for	self‐induced	intoxication	
In	 determining	 the	 appropriate	 sentence	 for	 an	 offence,	 the	 self‐induced	
intoxication	of	 the	offender	 at	 the	 time	 the	offence	was	 committed	 is	 not	 to	be	
taken	into	account	as	a	mitigating	factor.	
	
Arguably	 the	 inclusion	 of	 this	 section	 also	 did	 not	 significantly	 alter	 expressed	 sentencing	
principles	 in	NSW,	which	already	 recognised	 that	 intoxication	will	not	usually	be	a	mitigating	
factor.6		
	
In	2015	the	Attorney	General	asked	the	NSW	Sentencing	Council	to	consider	the	desirability	of	a	
further	amendment	(proposed	by	the	Thomas	Kelly	Youth	Foundation)	which	would	have	treated	
intoxication	 as	 an	 aggravating	 factor	 in	 sentencing.7	 After	 investigating	 the	 matter	 and	
considering	 submissions	 from	 a	 range	 of	 stakeholders,	 the	 Sentencing	 Council	 rejected	 the	
proposal	 (NSW	Sentencing	Council	 2015:	 [0.6]‐[0.7],	 [2.23];	 see	 also	NSW	Sentencing	 Council	
2009).	 In	a	context	where	knee‐jerk	punitive	criminal	 law	reform	without	expert/stakeholder	
consultation	has	become	commonplace	(the	new	assault	causing	death	offence	being	a	classic	
example),	 the	 decision	 not	 to	 add	 intoxication	 as	 an	 aggravating	 factor	 in	 sentencing	 is	
noteworthy.	Ironically,	however,	even	without	legislative	intervention,	a	more	punitive	approach	
to	sentencing	has	emerged	in	recent	years,	as	a	result	of	the	NSWCCA’s	approach	to	sentencing	in	
cases	of	alcohol‐related	fatal	violence.		
	
Judicial	engagement	with	the	challenges	of	alcohol‐related	violence	
I	have	already	noted	the	pressured	environment	in	which	the	NSW	Parliament	moved	hastily	to	
enact	 legislation	 in	 early	 2014.	 The	 courts	were	 also	 subjected	 to	 criticism	and	placed	under	
pressure	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	sentencing	of	Kieran	Loveridge	in	November	2013.	
The	clear	media‐driven	message	was	one	of	‘no	confidence’	in	a	judicial	system	that	was	‘out	of	
touch’	and	too	lenient	(for	example,	Bibby	2013;	Block	2013).	In	fact,	prior	to	the	tragic	events	of	
2012‐13,	 and	 the	 Government’s	 2014	 legislative	 response,	 the	 courts	 had	 already	 begun	 to	
grapple	 with	 the	 challenge	 of	 sentencing	 offenders	 in	 cases	 involving	 alcohol‐related	 fatal	
violence.	In	previous	research	on	sentencing	in	one	punch	manslaughter	cases	I	have	identified	
that	one	of	the	problems	courts	faced	in	such	matters	was	a	tension	in	evaluating	where	these	
offences	sit	in	terms	of	their	relative	objective	seriousness	(as	a	category	of	manslaughter)	and	
the	need	for	the	sentence	to	account	appropriately	for	general	deterrence	(Quilter	2014b).	Thus,	
while	each	case	ultimately	turns	on	its	facts,	a	line	of	authority	indicated	that	one	punch	deaths	
should	be	viewed	‘objectively	at	the	lower	end	of	the	range	of	criminal	conduct	within	that	offence	
[manslaughter]’.8	 Yet,	 even	 before	 Loveridge,	 there	 was	 recognition	 that	 there	 was	 a	 tension	
between	 this	 categorisation	 and	general	 sentencing	principles,	 specifically	 general	 deterrence	
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(Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW)	s	3A(b)),	denunciation	(s	3A(f)),	and	retribution	
which	is	commonly	articulated	as	necessary	in	these	matters.	For	example,	McClellan	CJ	at	CL	
stated	in	KT	v	The	Queen	(2008)	182	A	Crim	R	571:	
	
However,	there	is	considerable	force	in	the	view	that,	notwithstanding	the	youth	
of	the	offenders,	the	decisions	of	the	courts	for	this	type	of	offence	have	provided	a	
range	of	penalty	which	fails	to	adequately	reflect	the	need	for	general	deterrence	and	
retribution.	The	recent	experience	of	this	Court	indicates	that	the	range	of	penalties	
imposed	on	young	offenders	who	commit	random	acts	of	violence	resulting	in	death	
may	 not	 have	 been	 sufficient	 to	 deter	 others	 from	 similar	 irresponsible	 criminal	
behaviour.	In	my	opinion	although	the	circumstances	of	an	individual	offence	and	
offender	must	always	be	considered,	this	Court	should	in	future	accept	that	more	
significant	 penalties	may	 be	 required	when	 sentencing	 offenders	 for	 this	 type	 of	
offence	[emphases	added].9	(at	[41])	
	
Significantly,	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 violence	 being	 perpetrated	 in	 a	 public	 place	 after	 the	
consumption	of	alcohol—characteristic	of	a	majority	of	one	punch	manslaughters—was	said	to	
make	 the	 offence	 a	 serious	 one	 for	 which	 adequate	 punishment	 is	 required	 particularly	 for	
general	deterrence.10		
	
Prior	 to	 the	 decision	 in	Loveridge,	 therefore,	 there	 appeared	 to	 be	 a	 disjuncture	 between	 the	
practice	of	viewing	these	matters	objectively	at	the	lower	end	of	the	range	of	seriousness	and	the	
emphasis	on	the	need	for	general	deterrence	(denunciation	and	retribution)	in	relation	to	violent	
offences	perpetrated	in	public	places	particularly	after	the	consumption	of	alcohol.	It	is	also	noted	
that	 in	some	cases	 the	public	nature	of	 the	commission	of	 the	offence	was	used	 to	assess	 the	
objective	seriousness	of	 the	offence	producing	 further	possibilities	 for	a	conflict	 in	sentencing	
principles.11	These	tensions	are	reflected	in	the	judgment	of	R	v	CK,	TS	[2007]	NSWSC	1424	at	
[13]‐[15]:	
	
I	pause	to	observe	that,	in	terms	of	the	objective	gravity	of	this	offence,	it	matters	
little	that	the	offenders	each	inflicted	violence	upon	the	victim	once	or	twice.	The	
real	 gravamen	of	 the	offence	 lay	 in	 this	 entirely	 senseless,	 unprovoked,	 callous	
assault	upon	a	young	man,	minding	his	own	business	in	the	company	of	his	friends,	
in	a	public	place.		
	
…	 Some	 attempt	 must	 be	 made	 however,	 to	 mark	 the	 objective	 gravity	 of	 the	
offence,	constituted	by	the	unlawful	taking	of	a	human	life,	with	a	sentence	that	
reflects	 the	 principles	 of	 punishment,	 retribution,	 deterrence,	 protection	 of	 the	
community,	and	the	rehabilitation	of	the	offenders.		
	
Whilst	 the	 starting	point	 in	 this	 sentencing	 exercise	 is	 the	unlawful	 taking	 of	 a	
human	 life,	 the	sentence	 to	be	 imposed	at	 law	 is	 constrained	by	 the	basis	upon	
which	the	plea	has	been	entered.	The	law	demands	that	the	offenders	be	sentenced	
for	an	offence	that	is,	objectively	speaking,	at	the	lower	end	of	the	available	range,	
[emphasis	 added]	 the	 upper	 limit	 of	 which	 is	 the	 maximum	 penalty.	 That	
maximum	 penalty	 encompasses	 a	 very	 broad	 range	 of	 manslaughter	 offences,	
including	 manslaughter	 offences	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 characterised	 as	
murder,	but	for	the	presence	of	a	mental	illness	in	the	offender,	or	provocation,	or	
excessive	self‐defence.		
	
At	 the	 time	 Loveridge	was	 sentenced	 in	 2013,	 these	 tensions	had	not	 yet	 been	 resolved.	 The	
Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions’	 announcement	 on	 14	 November	 2013	 that	 his	 Office	 would	
appeal	 the	 sentence	 and	 apply	 for	 a	 guideline	 judgment	 in	 relation	 to	 such	 matters	 was	
recognition	of	the	need	to	seek	NSWCCA	guidance	on	this	matter	(Coultan	2013).	Although	the	
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formal	process	for	seeking	a	guideline	judgment	was	interrupted	by	the	actions	of	the	legislature	
in	introducing	a	new	assault	causing	death	offence,	I	will	argue	that	the	NSWCCA’s	decision	in	
Loveridge	 resolved	 the	 tensions	 described	 here	 and,	 to	 that	 extent,	 now	 operates	 as	 a	 ‘quasi’	
guideline	judgment	(see	Spigelman	1999).	
	
The	NSW	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	‘responds’:	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120		
The	normal	course	of	action	when	a	sentence	is	argued	to	be	manifestly	 inadequate	 is	 for	 the	
Crown	to	appeal—which	is	what	occurred.	On	4	July	2014	(that	is,	5	months	after	the	introduction	
of	 the	new	offences),	 the	NSWCCA	upheld	that	appeal	 in	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	finding	that	the	
original	sentence—which	included	an	8	year	head	sentence	for	manslaughter,	reduced	to	6	years	
after	application	of	the	guilty	plea	discount,	with	a	NPP	of	4	years—was	manifestly	inadequate.	
In	 re‐sentencing	 Loveridge,	 the	 NSWCCA	 determined	 that	 a	 head	 sentence	 of	 14	 years’	
imprisonment	was	appropriate,	reduced	to	(at	[271])	10.5	years	after	applying	the	25	per	cent	
discount	for	his	guilty	plea.	Loveridge’s	overall	sentence	(taking	into	account	the	other	assaults)	
was	increased	from	7	years	to	13	years	and	8	months,	with	a	total	NPP	of	10	years,	2	months	
(almost	double	the	originally	imposed	total	NPP	of	5	years,	2	months).		
	
In	the	context	of	my	concern	in	this	article,	to	locate	the	judicial	response	to	alcohol‐related	public	
violence	in	relation	to	the	legislative	response,	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	Court	produced	a	sentence	
(after	guilty	plea)	for	manslaughter	that	is	very	similar	to	the	outcome	that	is	mandated	by	s	25B	
of	the	Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW).	Section	25B	mandates	a	minimum	(that	is,	NPP)	of	8	years,	which,	
when	the	statutory	ratio	required	by	s	44	of	the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW)	is	
applied,	produces	a	head	sentence	of	just	over	10.5	years.	
	
The	 full	 significance	 of	 the	 NSWCCA’s	 increase	 in	 relation	 to	 Loveridge’s	 sentence	 for	
manslaughter	becomes	more	obvious	when	the	sentence	is	compared	with	previous	sentencing	
patterns	in	comparable	cases.	In	an	earlier	study,	I	found	that,	between	1998	and	2013	in	NSW,	
the	median	head	sentence	for	one	punch	manslaughter	cases	was	5	years	and	11	months	and	the	
median	NPP	was	3	years	and	6	months	(Quilter	2014b:	32).	The	median	head	sentence	for	all	
manslaughter	convictions	in	the	period	2006‐2013	was	7	years	(with	sentences	ranging	from	36	
months	to	more	than	20	years)	(Quilter	2014b:	32).	Acknowledging	that	the	NSWCCA	described	
Loveridge’s	violence	as	a	‘very	grave	example	of	manslaughter	by	unlawful	and	dangerous	act’	(at	
[267]),	it	is,	nonetheless,	important	to	consider	more	closely	how	and	why	the	NSWCCA	took	the	
view	that	such	a	significant	upward	‘correction’	was	warranted.	
	
I	argue	that	the	Court	did	three	things:	first,	it	refuted	the	notion	that	there	is	a	‘category’	of	one	
punch	 manslaughters;	 secondly,	 it	 rejected	 any	 ‘range’	 for	 such	 matters;	 thirdly,	 the	 Court	
manufactured	 a	 new	 category	 of	manslaughter	 which	 has	 been	 actively	 designed	 to	 produce	
higher	sentences.	The	new	category	has	a	heavy	emphasis	on	objective	seriousness	and	does	not	
carry	the	mitigating	‘baggage’	of	the	old	one	punch	category.	I	further	argue	that	this	change	was	
effected	through	an	approach	that	was	‘stylistically’	conservative:	a	careful	doctrinal	exegesis	of	
existing	sentencing	principles.	While	the	artifice	is	conservative,	I	will	show	that	the	substance	
has	effected	considerable	change.	Indeed,	this	judicial	reform	of	sentencing	may	prove	to	be	more	
radical	than	any	change	that	flows	from	the	reforms	introduced	by	the	legislature.12	
	
No	category	of	one	punch	manslaughters		
In	Loveridge	[2014]	the	NSWCCA	expressed	the	view	that	there	is	no	category	of	manslaughter	
denoted	 by	 a	 ‘one‐punch’	 or	 ‘single‐punch’	 element	 or	 characteristic	 (at	 [215]),	 because	 the	
circumstances	of	such	cases	vary	widely:	
	
…	it	is	not	meaningful	to	speak	of	one‐punch	or	single‐punch	manslaughter	cases	
as	constituting	a	single	class	of	offences.	The	circumstances	of	 these	cases	vary	
widely	…		
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Instead,	‘…	attention	must	be	given	to	the	particular	case	before	the	sentencing	court’	(at	[215]).		
	
While	 expressly	 refuting	 the	 one	 punch	 category	 it	 is	 noted	 that	 the	NSWCCA	 throughout	 its	
judgment,	nevertheless,	made	various	references	to	the	one	punch	class	or	category:	
	
No	other	sentencing	decision	in	this	State	for	so‐called	one‐punch	manslaughter	
involves	this	combination	of	factors.	(at	[207])	
	
…	where	Lord	Judge	CJ	…	again	addressed	the	topic	of	single‐punch	manslaughter	
cases.	(at	[209])	
	
With	 respect	 to	 a	 number	 of	 single‐blow	manslaughter	 sentencing	 decisions	 to	
which	his	Honour’s	attention	had	been	drawn	…	.	(at	[187])	
	
As	 noted	 above,	 prior	 to	 Loveridge,	 courts	 regularly	 recognised	 a	 category	 of	 one	 punch	
manslaughters.	Therefore,	the	NSWCCA’s	decision	to	disendorse	any	such	category	for	sentencing	
purposes	was	a	significant	development.	
	
No	range	of	sentences	for	one	punch	manslaughter	
The	Court	proceeded	to	acknowledge	that,	although	judgments	may	be	tendered	to	the	sentencing	
court	 for	 the	purpose	of	 the	provision	of	principles	 ‘relevant	 to	the	exercise	of	 the	sentencing	
discretion	in	the	case	at	hand’	(R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	at	[223])	following	the	High	Court	ruling	in	
Barbaro	v	R;	Zirilli	v	R	(2014)	305	ALR	323	and	Hili	v	R	(2010)	272	ALR	465,	a	numerical	range	
should	 not	 be	 submitted	 by	 counsel	 in	 order	 to	 guide	 the	 sentencing	 Judge	 in	 their	 current	
sentencing	task:		
	
There	is,	in	truth,	no	range	of	sentences	for	offences	of	manslaughter	which	may	
be	said	to	have	a	single	common	component	relating	to	the	mechanism	of	death	
(such	as	the	victim’s	head	striking	 the	ground	after	a	blow	to	 the	head).	To	 the	
same	effect,	there	is	no	range	of	sentences	for	manslaughter	offences	said	to	have	
been	committed	by	use	of	a	knife	or	a	rock	or	some	other	implement.		
	
The	myriad	circumstances	of	manslaughter	offences	render	it	unhelpful	to	speak	
in	terms	of	a	range	of	sentences,	or	tariff,	for	a	particular	form	of	manslaughter.	
Gleeson	CJ	made	 this	 clear	 in	R	v	Blacklidge	…	 .	 (R	v	Loveridge	 [2014]	at	 [226]‐
[227])		
	
Thus,	 in	 relation	 to	manslaughter,	 the	 justification	 for	 denying	 the	 use	 of	 a	 numerical	 range	
appears	 to	 be	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 premise	 that	 manslaughter,	 as	 a	 broadly	 defined	 offence,	
necessarily	 involves	 widely	 varying	 ‘myriad	 circumstances’	 and,	 consequently,	 it	 would	 be	
artificial	to	categorise	types	of	manslaughter	that	are	said	to	have	common	elements	(such	as	an	
alcohol‐fuelled	single	punch	attack	to	the	victim	causing	the	victim	to	fall	and	strike	their	head).	
	
In	Barbaro	v	R,	the	High	Court	defined	‘range’	as	being	a	reference	to	the	upper	and	lower	bounds	
of	 discretionary	 judgment	 which,	 if	 exceeded,	 would	 fall	 into	 legal	 error	 for	 either	 being	
manifestly	excessive	or	manifestly	inadequate	(at	[26]).	The	High	Court	discussed	the	practice	
developed	in	Victoria	since	R	v	MacNeil‐Brown	(2008)	20	VR	677	whereby	the	sentencing	judge	
would	ask	counsel	for	the	prosecution	to	make	a	submission	as	to	the	available	range	of	sentences	
(Barbaro	at	[22]),	a	practice	condemned	by	the	High	Court	in	Barbaro	for	a	number	of	reasons:	
	
1. The	 suggestion	 of	 a	 range,	 in	 terms	 of	 integrity,	 is	 contingent	 upon	 the	 provision	 of	
‘accurate,	reliable	and	complete	information’	(at	[30]).	Ultimately	however,	counsel	for	
the	prosecution	‘cannot	be,	dispassionate’	(at	[32]).	
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2. ‘If	a	judge	sentences	within	the	range	which	has	been	suggested	by	the	prosecution,	the	
statement	of	that	range	may	well	be	seen	as	suggesting	that	the	sentencing	judge	has	been	
swayed	by	the	prosecution’s	view	of	what	punishment	should	be	imposed.	By	contrast,	if	
the	sentencing	judge	fixes	a	sentence	outside	the	suggested	range,	appeal	against	sentence	
seems	well‐nigh	inevitable’	(at	[33]).	
3. Fixing	 a	 range	 also	 ‘wrongly	 suggests	 that	 sentencing	 is	 a	 mathematical	 exercise.	
Sentencing	an	offender	is	not,	and	cannot	be	undertaken	as,	some	exercise	in	addition	or	
subtraction.	A	sentencing	judge	must	reach	a	single	sentence	for	each	offence	and	they	
must	do	so	by	balancing	many	different	and	conflicting	features’	(at	[34]).		
	
Moreover,	the	High	Court	gave	particular	attention	to	the	fact	that	any	submission	by	counsel	as	
to	 an	 appropriate	 range	 necessarily	 involves	 assumptions	 being	made	 by	 counsel	 as	 to	what	
considerations	 bear	 upon	 the	 sentence	 and	 what	 weight	 is	 given	 to	 each	 (at	 [35]),	 such	 as	
predictions	about	the	facts	that	the	sentencing	judge	will	find	(at	[36]).		
	
Essentially,	as	there	is	a	multiplicity	of	circumstances	for	consideration	in	the	sentencing	exercise,	
any	 suggestion	 regarding	 an	 applicable	 range	 will	 be	 founded	 upon	 assumptions	 made	 by	
counsel,	assumptions	which	may	be	at	odds	with	findings	of	the	sentencing	judge.	Consequently,	
if	the	judge	were	to	rely	upon	the	range,	it	would	be	effectively	distorting	the	applicable	sentence	
in	the	judge’s	mind.	Seen	in	another	light,	this	somewhat	shifts	the	role	of	sentencing	(and	fact	
finding	for	sentencing	purposes)	from	the	judiciary	to	counsel.	
	
The	Court	recognised	there	 is	still	a	place	 for	reviewing	material	on	sentences	that	have	been	
imposed	in	other	(more	or	less)	comparable	cases:	
	
Consistency	 of	 sentencing	 is	 important.	 But	 the	 consistency	 that	 is	 sought	 is	
consistency	 in	 the	 application	 of	 relevant	 legal	 principles,	 not	 numerical	
equivalence.	The	history	[of	previous	cases]	stands	as	a	yardstick	against	which	to	
examine	a	proposed	sentence.	What	is	important	is	the	unifying	principles	which	
those	sentences	both	reveal	and	reflect.	(at	[40],	[41])	
	
It	follows	that,	while	reference	to	comparable	cases	(which	may	suggest	a	range)	may	be	useful	
for	the	purpose	of	extrapolating	the	relevant	principles	applicable	to	the	case	at	hand,	they	should	
not	be	employed	as	a	restrictive	mathematical	template.	
	
The	High	Court’s	rejection	of	the	validity	of	numerical	ranges	was	an	important	part	of	the	logic	
by	which	 the	 NSWCCA	 found	 fault	with	 the	 original	 sentencing	 decision	 in	Loveridge.	 Justice	
Campbell	J	had	stated	in	Loveridge	[2014]	at	[224]	(and	[188]):	
	
These	cases,	which	both	the	Crown	and	the	defence	drew	to	my	attention,	suggest	
most	commonly	for	broadly	similar	offending	for	relatively	young	offenders	a	non‐
parole	period	of	3	years	and	6	months	is	regarded	as	appropriate.	A	head	sentence	
of	between	5	and	6	years,	depending	on	whether	special	circumstances	are	found,	
is	 commonly	 imposed.	 Occasionally	 higher	 or	 lesser	 sentences	 are	 imposed	
according	to	the	particular	circumstances	of	that	case.	 I	acknowledge	that	 these	
cases	provide	some	guidance.	
	
The	 NSWCCA	 found	 that	 the	 sentencing	 judge	 had	 treated	 tendered	 sentencing	 judgments	
erroneously,	by	perceiving	the	existence	of	a	sentencing	range,	and	had	thereby	fallen	into	error.	
	
It	is	appropriate	to	acknowledge	that,	prior	to	the	High	Court’s	rejection	of	numerical	ranges,	it	
was	common	in	one	punch	manslaughter	cases	for	sentencing	judges	to	apply,	and	the	NSWCCA	
to	endorse,	a	range.13	For	example,	in	Donaczy	v	R	[2010]	NSWCCA	143	at	[54]	the	Court	stated:		
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It	 is	 unnecessary	 to	 enter	 any	 exegesis	 on	 the	 seriousness	 of	 alcohol	 fuelled	
violence	in	public	places	to	understand	that	the	sentence	imposed	by	the	learned	
sentencing	judge	was	well	within	the	range	for	an	offence	of	this	character.	
	
And	in	R	v	Carroll	[2008]	NSWCCA	218	at	[23]:	
	
In	my	view,	the	term	of	imprisonment	which	her	Honour	imposed	was	below	the	
appropriate	range	for	this	offence.		
	
Although	presented	as	a	conventional	and	neutral	articulation	of	correct	sentencing	doctrine,	it	
is	important	to	recognise	that,	in	Loveridge,	the	NSWCCA	was	doing	more	than	simply	embracing	
and	 applying	 the	 High	 Court’s	 distaste	 for	 sentencing	 ranges	 as	 a	matter	 of	 principle.	 It	was	
actively	rejecting	the	tendency	to	treat	one	punch	fatalities	as	at	the	lower	end	of	a	manslaughter	
sentencing	range.	By	declaring	that	no	such	range	(and	range	 location)	existed,	 the	Court	was	
relieved	of	the	burden	of	the	traditional	characterisation	of	one	punch	homicides	as	an	unlucky	
case	of	fatality,	which	reduced	their	objective	seriousness.	By	refuting	any	notion	that	there	is	a	
category	of	one	punch	cases,	or	any	range	that	might	apply	to	them,	the	NSWCCA	paved	the	way	
for	 a	 fresh	 approach	 to	 the	 sentencing	 of	 Loveridge,	 consistent	 with	 a	 finding	 that	 the	 case	
represented	a	‘very	grave	example	of	manslaughter	by	unlawful	and	dangerous	act’	(Loveridge	
[2014]	at	[267]).	
	
Decisions	 since	 Loveridge	 make	 it	 clear	 that	 judges	 have	 heard	 the	 NSWCCA’s	 message	 in	
Loveridge:	no	sentencing	range	exists	for	one	punch	manslaughter	cases.14	However,	in	the	next	
part	of	this	article	I	argue	that	the	effect	of	the	NSWCCA’s	decision	in	Loveridge	was	that,	at	the	
very	 time	 that	 the	 Court	 rejected	 a	 discrete	 category	 and	 range	 for	 one	 punch	 fatalities,	 it	
effectively	ushered	in	a	new	category	and	a	new	range	designed	to	produce	significantly	higher	
sentences	than	the	range	that	was	abandoned	(or,	in	the	language	and	style	of	the	Court,	declared	
not	to	exist).		
	
A	 new	 category?	 Violence,	 public	 place,	 alcohol‐fuelled	 and	 the	 need	 for	 general	
deterrence	
Given	the	conviction	with	which	the	NSWCCA	in	Loveridge	effected	the	demise	of	a	one	punch	
manslaughter	 category	 or	 sentencing	 range,	 it	might	 have	 been	 assumed	 that	 the	 Court	 was	
generally	opposed	to	such	categories/ranges.	On	the	contrary,	having	dismissed	the	one	punch	
category,	the	Court	immediately	recognised	a	new	one	of	manslaughter	involving:	(1)	violence,	
(2)	 fuelled	by	alcohol,	(3)	 in	a	public	place	(that	 is,	 the	elements	that,	arguably,	were	defining	
features	of	the	so‐called	one	punch	manslaughter	category):	
	
Firstly,	it	is	not	meaningful	to	speak	of	one	punch	or	single	punch	manslaughter	
cases	as	constituting	a	single	class	of	offences.	The	circumstances	of	these	cases	
vary	 widely	 and	 attention	 must	 be	 given	 to	 the	 particular	 case	 before	 the	
sentencing	court.	
	
Secondly,	 the	commission	of	offences	of	violence,	 including	manslaughter,	 in	 the	
context	of	alcohol	fuelled	conduct	in	a	public	street	or	public	place	is	of	great	concern	
to	the	community,	and	calls	for	an	emphatic	sentencing	response	to	give	particular	
effect	to	the	need	for	denunciation,	punishment	and	general	deterrence	[emphases	
added].	The	United	Kingdom	decisions	involve	statements	of	serious	concern	by	
the	courts	of	the	type	expressed	in	this	State	in	Hopley	v	R,	R	v	Carroll	and	Pattalis	
v	R	concerning	a	similar	form	of	violent	offending.	(at	[215]‐[216];	see	also	[185]).	
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Rather	 than	 ascribing	 a	 range	 to	 offences	 that	 fall	 within	 the	 new	 category,	 the	 NSWCCA	
prescribes	a	certain	level	of	objective	seriousness	that	should	be	applied	to	those	cases	based	on	
the	need	for	general	deterrence	(in	particular),	denunciation	and	punishment.	
	
The	Court	founded	the	new	category	on	a	lengthy	discussion	of	various	cases	(especially	from	the	
UK	where	the	courts	had	grappled	with	similar	concerns)	which	featured	violence	(at	[101]),15	
committed	in	a	public	area	or	street	(at	[101])16	and	fuelled	by	alcohol	and	drugs	(at	[101]).17	
Notably,	the	focus	is	on	violence,	however	inflicted,	rather	than	the	particularity	of	one	punch	or	
single	punch	methods	of	attack	(at	[102]	and	[208]).	The	NSWCCA	also	attached	significance	to	
other	features	of	the	type	of	violence	in	question:	that	the	attack	was	unprovoked	(or	that	the	
victim	was	innocent)	(at	[102],	[105],	[203]	[208]	and	[210]);	that	the	violence	was	gratuitous	(at	
[152],	[208],	[209],	[210]	and	[213]);	and	that	the	victim	was	randomly	selected,	without	warning	
(at	[102],	[105],	[122],	[152],	[156]).	It	seems	that,	when	these	additional	elements	are	present,	
the	seriousness	of	the	core	Loveridge	category	is	increased:	
	
The	use	of	lethal	force	against	a	vulnerable,	unsuspecting	and	innocent	victim	on	a	
public	street	in	the	course	of	alcohol	fuelled	aggression	accompanied,	as	it	was,	by	
other	 nonfatal	 attacks	 by	 the	 Respondent	 upon	 vulnerable,	 unsuspecting	 and	
innocent	citizens	in	the	crowded	streets	of	King	[sic]	Cross	on	a	Saturday	evening,	
called	 for	 the	 express	 and	 demonstrable	 application	 of	 the	 element	 of	 general	
deterrence	as	a	powerful	factor	on	sentence	in	this	case.	(at	105])	
	
The	NSWCCA	further	underscored	the	need	for	increased	sentencing	severity	in	such	cases,	by	
reference	to	other	cases:	
	
Other	 decisions	 of	 this	 Court	 have	 emphasised	 that	 violence	 on	 the	 streets,	
especially	by	young	men	in	company	and	under	the	influence	of	alcohol	and	drugs,	
is	 all	 too	 common	 and	 needs	 to	 be	 addressed	 by	 sentences	 that	 carry	 a	 very	
significant	 degree	 of	 general	 deterrence:	 R	 v	 Mitchell;	 R	 v	 Gallagher	 [2007]	
NSWCCA	296;	177	A	Crim	R	94	at	101	[29].	Even	in	the	case	of	juvenile	offenders	
(which	the	Respondent	is	not),	this	Court	has	emphasised	that,	in	relation	to	crimes	
of	 violence	 committed	 in	 the	 streets	 by	 groups	 of	 young	 persons,	 general	
deterrence	should	be	given	substantial	weight	notwithstanding	the	youth	of	the	
offenders:	AI	v	R	[2011]	NSWCCA	95	at	[69];	MB	v	R	[2013]	NSWCCA	254	at	[27].	
(at	[103])	
	
The	approach	of	the	UK	Court	of	Appeal	in	Attorney	General’s	Reference	No.	60	of	2009	(Appleby	
and	Ors)	[2009]	EWCA	Crim	2693;	[2010]	2	Cr	App	R(S)	46	was	strongly	endorsed:	
	
The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 (Criminal	 Division)	 returned	 to	 this	 issue	 in	…	Appleby	 …	
where	Lord	 Judge	CJ	…	again	addressed	the	topic	of	single‐punch	manslaughter	
cases.	Lord	Judge	CJ	observed,	at	[12],	that	‘…	an	additional	feature	of	manslaughter	
cases	which	has	come	to	be	seen	as	a	significant	aggravating	feature	of	any	such	case	
is	the	public	impact	of	violence	on	the	streets,	whether	in	city	centres,	or	residential	
areas	…	Specific	attention	should	be	paid	to	the	problem	of	gratuitous	violence	in	city	
centres	and	the	streets’	[emphasis	in	original].		
	
Lord	Judge	CJ	continued	at	[12]:	
‘…	 the	 manslaughter	 cases	 with	 which	 we	 are	 concerned	 involved	 gratuitous,	
unprovoked	 violence	 in	 the	 streets	 of	 the	 kind	which	 seriously	 discourages	 law‐
abiding	citizens	from	walking	their	streets,	particularly	at	night,	and	gives	the	city	
and	town	centres	over	to	the	kind	of	drunken	yobbery	with	which	we	have	become	
familiar,	and	a	worried	perception	among	decent	citizens	that	it	is	not	safe	to	walk	
the	streets	at	night’	[emphasis	in	original].	
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This	statement	echoes	loudly	in	the	context	of	the	present	appeal.	(at	[209]‐[210])	
	
It	is	important	to	recognise	the	significance	of	what	took	place	in	Loveridge.	The	NSWCCA	did	not	
simply	 adjust	 the	 terminology	 from	 one	 punch	 to	 violence	 +	 alcohol	 +	 public	 (+	 random,	
unprovoked,	innocent	victim).	I	argue	that	it	replaced	one	category	(one	punch	manslaughter)	
which	 had	 typically	 resulted	 in	 lower	 sentences,	with	 a	 new	 category	which	was	 designed	 to	
support	 higher	 sentences.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 wider	 policy	 and	 law	 reform	 debate	 over	
government	response	to	alcohol‐related	violence,	the	importance	of	this	move	by	the	judicial	arm	
of	government	should	not	be	overlooked.		
	
The	characteristics	of	the	Loveridge	category	
Later	in	the	article,	I	examine	the	practical	effect	that	the	Loveridge	decision	has	had	on	sentences	
in	the	Supreme	Court	of	NSW	in	2014	and	2015,	and	demonstrate	that	crimes	that	fall	within	the	
Loveridge	 category	 are	 now	 likely	 to	 receive	 a	 significantly	 longer	 prison	 term.	 Given	 the	
seriousness	of	these	consequences,	it	might	have	been	expected	that	the	Court	would	explain	with	
some	precision	the	sorts	of	cases	in	which	a	greater	need	for	general	deterrence	arises.	Yet,	on	
closer	inspection,	it	is	apparent	that	the	NSWCCA	has	neither	precisely	drawn	nor	fully	articulated	
the	relevant	criteria.	In	this	part	of	the	article	I	look	more	closely	at	the	principles	endorsed,	and	
the	 language	 used	 by,	 the	 NSWCCA	 in	 Loveridge.	 I	 will	 consider	 how	 sentencing	 judges	 in	
subsequent	cases	have	received,	interpreted	and	applied	the	Loveridge	category.	In	turn,	I	seek	to	
determine	whether	the	courts	have	provided	further	illumination	of	the	characteristics	said	to	
warrant	higher	penalties.		
	
Violence	
One	of	the	NSWCCA’s	objectives	in	Loveridge	was	to	signal	that	an	‘emphatic	sentencing	response’	
(emphasising	general	deterrence,	denunciation	and	punishment)	was	warranted	 in	relation	to	
offences	of	‘violence’,	not	only	in	classic	one	punch	scenarios	but	more	generally.	To	this	extent,	
its	message	has	been	received.		
	
In	R	v	Wood	[2014]	NSWCCA	184	the	violence	involved	a	push	by	the	deceased	‘with	two	open	
hands’	to	the	victim’s	upper	chest	area,	causing	her	to	fall	and	strike	her	head	on	the	concrete’	(at	
[11]).	The	Court	was	satisfied	that	this	was	a	case	in	which	the	‘emphatic	response’	from	Loveridge	
was	required.	(at	[65]‐[66])	
	
In	R	v	Lane	(No	3)	[2015]	NSWSC	118	at	[80]	there	was	a	heated	exchange	of	words	between	the	
victim	 and	 offender	 followed	 by	 grappling	 whereby	 the	 victim	 got	 the	 upper	 hand	 and	
subsequently	 retreated,	 lost	 his	 footing	 and	 fell	 over.	 The	 victim’s	 friend	 then	 engaged	 the	
offender	in	a	physical	altercation	before	the	victim	stood	back	up	and	faced	the	offender.	Both	
exchanged	blows,	and	consequently	the	victim	fell	back	and	hit	his	head	on	the	ground.	Although	
this	was	not	a	classic	one	punch	attack,	the	Court	held	that	there	was	a	need	for	the	‘emphatic	
sentencing	response	discussed	in	Loveridge’	(Lane	at	[80]),	reflecting	‘denunication,	punishment	
and	general	deterrence’	(Loveridge	[2014]	at	[216]).		
	
In	R	v	Matthews	[2015]	NSWSC	49	the	physical	conduct	constituting	the	assault	was	not	a	single	
punch,	but	rather	a	series	of	punches	that	were	exchanged	during	the	course	of	a	fight	between	
the	victim	and	the	offender	(who	were	known	to	each	other,	and	where	it	was	unclear	who	threw	
the	first	punch).	Nonetheless,	the	Court	was	satisfied	that	the	case	bore	the	characteristics	which,	
according	to	Loveridge,	warranted	harsher	punishment:		
	
The	matters	which	make	 the	 present	 offence	 a	 serious	 one	 are	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
resulted	from	alcohol‐fuelled	violence	committed	in	a	public	place	by	a	person	who	
had	 a	 most	 unsatisfactory	 record	 for	 violence	 in	 circumstances	 where	 he	 had	
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recently	 been	 placed	 on	 conditional	 liberty	 with	 a	 requirement	 not	 to	 drink	
alcohol.	
	
Finally,	 in	R	v	Lambaditis	 [2015]	NSWSC	746,	 the	Court	 found	 that	 the	 need	 for	 an	 emphatic	
sentencing	 response	 highlighting	 general	 deterrence	 (at	 [98])	 echoed	 loudly	 as	 the	 offence	
involved	 ‘gratuitous,	 unprovoked	 violence’	 fuelled	 by	 alcohol	 (at	 [96]‐[97]),	 comprised	 a	
cowardly	attack,	and	was	committed	in	a	public	place	(at	[102];	see	also	R	v	Dyer	[2014]	NSWSC	
1809	at	[5];	R	v	Field	[2014]	NSWSC	1797	at	[83]	and	[85]).	
	
Public	area	
In	R	v	Wood	the	Court	emphasised	the	general	entitlement	to	feel	and	be	safe	when	out	in	public:		
	
People	have	the	right	to	expect	that	their	streets	will	be	safe.	(at	[66])	
	
Guidance	to	sentencing	judges	that	may	be	provided	by	this	decision	includes	the	
need	for	general	deterrence	when	elderly	or	vulnerable	persons	are	attacked	in	
public	places.	(at	[101])	
	
In	R	v	Field	the	Court	asserted	that	the	fact	that	the	offence	was	carried	out	‘in	full	public	view’,	
‘in	a	carpark	open	to	members	of	the	public	and	in	sight	of	neigbouring	residents	and	visitors	to	
the	area	who	were	attracted	to	the	incident’,	was	significant	in	triggering	a	sentence	that	drew	
heavily	on	general	deterrence	(at	[14]	and	[83]).	
	
In	R	v	Lane,	where	the	assault	took	place	in	the	northern	NSW	town	of	Casino,	the	Court	lamented	
the	 fact	 that	 ‘the	 scourge	 of	 alcohol‐fuelled	 violence	 in	 public	 places	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 the	
entertainment	hubs	of	our	major	cities’	(at	[7]).	The	fact	that	the	violence	occurred	in	a	public	
place	added	to	objective	seriousness	(at	[38]).		
	
Fuelled	by	alcohol	and	drugs	
Some	post‐Loveridge	cases	have	accepted	the	view	that,	intoxication	of	the	offender	will	increase	
the	objective	seriousness	of	the	offence.	For	instance,	in	R	v	Lane:	
	
…	the	features	of	the	present	case	which	lead	me	to	conclude	it	is	an	objectively	
serious	 one	 include	 that	 the	 crime	 was	 committed	 in	 a	 public	 place	 when	 the	
offender	was	very	intoxicated.	(at	[38])		
	
However,	in	other	cases	it	is	possible	to	detect	some	uncertainty	about	the	value	judgment	that	
intoxicated	violence	is	more	serious	than	violence	perpetrated	while	sober.	Interestingly	in	R	v	
Lambaditis	 the	Court	 stated	 that	 the	offender’s	 ‘…	 intoxicated	 state	provides	at	 least	 a	partial	
explanation	 for	 his	 behaviour	 but	 in	 no	way	 provides	 either	 justification	 or	mitigation	 of	 the	
objective	seriousness	of	the	offence	or	the	culpability	of	the	offender’	(at	[30]).	
	
In	 R	 v	McNeil	 (No	 4)	 [2015]	 NSWSC	 1198,	 the	 offender’s	 state	 of	 intoxication	 (‘reasonably	
intoxicated’)	was	not	given	much	weight	(at	[4]).	In	fact,	the	Court	held	that	alcohol	consumption	
had	contributed	to	the	offender’s	misconception	that	the	victim	was	part	of	a	group	of	youths	with	
whom	he	had	just	been	involved	in	an	altercation:	‘With	a	mind	addled	by	alcohol,	he	completely	
misconceived	 the	 situation	 there	 and	 gave	 vent	 to	 a	perceived,	 but	 grossly	mistaken,	 need	 to	
violently	punish	an	innocent	young	man’	(at	[29]).	Although	the	Court	said	that	this	did	not	justify	
his	violent	behaviour,	it	does	appear	that,	on	this	occasion,	the	offender’s	intoxication	was	not	a	
factor	which	was	regarded	as	increasing	his	culpability.	
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Unprovoked/gratuitous		
In	 R	 v	Wood	 the	 Court	 emphasised	 that	 the	 victim	 was	 merely	 minding	 her	 own	 business,	
unsuspecting	that	she	would	be	attacked	in	any	manner.	The	Court	also	suggests	that	the	fact	that	
an	assault	is	unprovoked	goes	hand‐in‐hand	with	gratuitousness:	
	
The	Judge’s	remarks	included	that	the	deceased	was	an	elderly,	vulnerable	female	
going	about	her	ordinary	daily	life,	who	was	entitled	to	expect	that	she	would	not	
be	confronted	or	assaulted	in	the	manner	that	she	was.	The	Judge	found	that	the	
respondent’s	 conduct	 was	 unprovoked,	 callous	 and	 gratuitous	 and	 of	 such	
sufficient	force	that	it	caused	the	deceased	to	fall	backwards	and	strike	her	head	
on	the	concrete.	(at	[25])	
	
…	she	was	an	elderly	woman	who	had	done	nothing	to	provoke	his	aggression.	(at	
[88])	
	
The	coupling	together	of	‘gratuitous’	and	‘unprovoked’	violence	is	also	seen	in	R	v	Lambaditis,	the	
Court	observing	that	the	victims	were	‘simply	enjoying	a	night	out’	and	were	attacked	‘without	
any	interference	or	provocation’	(at	[94]).		
	
In	R	v	Field,	the	sentencing	judge	said:	
	
…	I	am	satisfied	beyond	reasonable	doubt	having	regard	to	all	the	evidence,	and	
consistent	with	the	jury	verdict,	that	it	was	the	offender’s	punch	to	the	deceased	
left	jaw	that	caused	him	to	immediately	collapse	or	drop	to	the	ground,	and	that	
the	punch	was	both	unprovoked	and	gratuitous.	(at	[58])	
	
…	I	am	satisfied	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	in	so	doing	he	acted	in	a	state	of	
uncontrolled	anger,	unprovoked	by	anything	Mr	Kane	said	or	did.	(at	[64]	and	also	
[83])	
	
The	gratuitousness	of	the	violence	was	underscored	by	reason	that	the	victim	‘…	was	doing	little	
more	than	peacefully	spending	time	with	an	old	friend	while	his	partner	…	was	at	a	work	dinner	
in	another	part	of	the	hotel’	(at	[6]).		
	
Conversely,	in	R	v	Dyer,	provocation	was	found	to	exist.	The	homeless	victim	had	left	his	trolley	
of	possessions	in	the	middle	of	the	road	when	the	offender	tried	to	remove	it	for	the	purpose	of	
safety.	The	victim	responded	with	‘clenched	and	raised’	fists,	as	‘if	preparing	to	fight’	(at	[4]).	The	
victim	had	 then	moved	 his	 fists	 around	 in	 a	 boxing	motion	 followed	 by	 a	 number	 of	 pushes,	
continued	aggression	and	fists	still	clenched	prior	to	being	hit	(at	[5]).	In	relation	to	this	element	
the	NSWCCA	 said:	 ‘I	 do	 not	mean	 by	 that	 statement	 to	 suggest	 the	 Prisoner	was	 in	 any	way	
justified	in	his	reaction,	merely	to	acknowledge	a	contributing	factor’	(at	[24]).	
	
In	R	v	Lane	there	was	a	degree	of	provocation	by	the	victim,	who	had	initially	said	something	to	
the	offender	or	his	accompanying	son,	resulting	in	an	initial	grappling,	and	a	subsequent	exchange	
of	blows,	before	the	final	punch	causing	the	death	was	thrown.	However,	the	Court	seemed	to	find	
that	the	provocation	was	overcome	by	the	offender’s	escalation	of	‘the	aggression	even	after	Mr	
Morris	[the	victim]	sought	to	disengage	himself	from	the	fracas’	(at	[38]).	
	
Without	in	any	way	blaming	Mr	Morris	for	what	happened	there	does	seem	to	have	
been	an	angry	exchange	of	words	between	two	intoxicated,	middle‐aged	men,	each	
of	whom	should	have	known	better.	Moreover,	Mr	Morris	was	willing	to	grapple	
with	 the	 offender	 and	 initially	 seems	 to	 have	 obtained	 the	 upper	 hand.	 The	
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offender’s	culpability	consists	of	escalating	the	violence	after	Mr	Morris	attempted	
to	disengage	from	him.	(at	[79])	
	
The	result	was	a	finding	that	there	was	no	‘substantial	provocation’	which	implies	that	there	is	a	
threshold	level	of	provocation	which	must	be	satisfied	before	the	seriousness	of	the	offence	can	
be	said	to	be	mitigated	(at	[8]).	
	
There	 is	 a	 strong	 association	 between	 the	 characterisation	 of	 violence	 as	 gratuitous	 and	 an	
assessment	that	the	victim	was	 ‘innocent’.	Interestingly,	 in	R	v	Lane	the	Court	noted	that	 ‘This	
case	is	different	from	some	other	cases	of	drunken,	public	violence.	The	offender	did	not	single	
out	an	unsuspecting	innocent	bystander	for	the	infliction	of	gratuitous	violence.’	(at	[79];	see	also	
R	v	McNeil	(No	4)	at	[29])	
	
Two	further	insights	emerge	from	this	discussion	of	what	I	have	called	the	Loveridge	category.	
First,	 there	 is	 a	 notable	 similarity	 between	 the	 language	 employed	 by	 the	 NSWCCA—and	
endorsed	by	subsequent	 judgments—to	describe	the	hallmarks	of	the	types	of	violence	where	
general	 deterrence	 warrants	 greater	 emphasis	 (thus	 producing	 higher	 penalties),	 and	 the	
rhetorical	 tropes	about	alcohol‐related	street	violence	that	were	prominent	 in	both	the	media	
commentary	 and	 political	 discourse	 following	 Thomas	 Kelly’s	 death	 and	 Kieran	 Loveridge’s	
original	sentencing	(Quilter	2014a).	This	reinforces	the	point	made	earlier	that	the	NSWCCA’s	
recalibration	 of	 sentencing	 principles	 and	 practises	 can	 and	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 responsive	 to	
hardening	community	attitudes	about	alcohol‐related	violence.	Second,	the	manner	in	which	the	
NSWCCA	has	expressed	the	indicia	of	what	I	refer	to	as	the	Loveridge	category	has	left	sentencing	
judges	with	considerable	work	to	do—and,	therefore,	considerable	discretion—in	identifying	the	
‘edges’	of	where	the	category	starts	and	ends.	In	the	next	part	of	this	article	I	consider	how	post‐
Loveridge	 courts	 have	 responded	 to	 the	 NSWCCA’s	 message,	 and	 the	 terms	 in	 which	 it	 was	
articulated.	
	
The	‘no	range’	message	and	the	edges	of	the	Loveridge	category	
No	range		
In	R	v	Wood,	the	NSWCCA	took	the	opportunity	to	reaffirm	that	‘we	do	not	consider	that	there	is	
a	well	recognised	group	of	cases	where	a	single	punch	or	push	has	resulted	in	death’	(at	[55]).	It	
followed	 that	 the	 sentencing	 judge’s	 statement	 that	 the	 sentencing	 decision	 to	 be	made	was	
‘constrained	to	provide	a	sentence	as	guided	by	the	overall	pattern	of	current	sentencing’	was	an	
error	(at	[52]	and	[54]).	The	NSWCCA	went	on	to	hold	that	sentencing	statistics	are	of	even	less	
assistance	 in	 the	offence	of	manslaughter	compared	with	other	offences,	as	 the	circumstances	
between	 the	 cases	 vary	 significantly	 and	 are	 thus	 largely	 incomparable.	 In	 other	 words	 the	
statistics	are	unhelpful	and	potentially	dangerous	as	no	account	is	made	for	the	irreconcilable	
disparities	between	the	cases	of	manslaughter	(at	[56]).	Consequently,	the	NSWCCA	went	as	far	
as	saying	that	sentencing	statistics	should	be	altogether	avoided	in	the	sentencing	process	 for	
manslaughter	offences	(at	[56]).	
	
There	is	strong	evidence	that	the	‘no	range’	message	has	been	heard	and	embraced	by	sentencing	
judges	in	NSW,	as	illustrated	by	the	following	remarks	in	post‐Loveridge	cases:		
	
…	the	circumstances	in	which	manslaughter	occurs	are	almost	infinitely	variable.	
The	same	can	be	said	of	‘one‐punch’	manslaughter	and	in	these	circumstances	I	do	
not	think	that	anything	is	to	be	gained	by	detailed	reference	to	any	of	the	numerous	
cases	where	such	killings	have	been	considered.	(R	v	Wood	at	[56])	
	
[Comparable	 sentencing	 judgments]	 of	 course,	 do	not	 disclose	 a	 range	of	 tariff.	
When	 sentencing	 for	manslaughter,	 a	 court	 is	 always	 to	have	 regard	 to	 the	 full	
context	in	which	death	has	occurred.	(R	v	Lambadatis	at	[99])	
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It	 is	 no	 longer	appropriate	 to	 [sic]	 for	 this	 court	 to	 regard	one	punch	or	 single	
punch	 cases	 of	manslaughter	 as	 constituting	 a	 single	 class	 of	 offence	 since	 the	
objective	 seriousness	 of	 each	 case	 may	 vary	 widely.	 It	 is	 essential	 that	 the	
particular	case	under	consideration	is	the	focus	(see	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	
120).	(R	v	Field	at	[91])		
	
It	is	well	recognised	in	our	criminal	law	that	the	crime	of	manslaughter	covers	a	
very	 wide	 range	 of	 criminality	 and	 culpability	 …	 The	 court	 must	 eschew	 any	
attempt	 to	 put	 cases	 of	 manslaughter	 into	 preconceived	 categories.	 Such	
categories	do	not	exist.	(R	v	Lane	(No	3)	at	[37]	and	[68])	
	
Limiting	the	category	
There	can	be	little	doubt	that	the	objective	of	the	NSWCCA	in	Loveridge	was	to	‘raise	the	bar’	when	
it	comes	to	sentencing	in	certain	sorts	of	crimes	of	violence.	As	I		show	in	the	next	part	of	this	
article,	 this	 has	 certainly	 been	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 decision:	my	 analysis	 of	 sentencing	 decisions	
handed	down	after	Loveridge	suggests	that,	if	it	is	determined	that	a	case	falls	within	the	Loveridge	
category	 the	 level	of	objective	seriousness	attached	 to	 that	case	operates	as	a	default	 starting	
point	 in	 the	 sentencing	process,	 resulting	 in	higher	sentences.	Any	deviation	 from	that	 line	of	
sentencing	severity	must	be	expressly	justified.	Ironically,	however,	the	NSWCCA’s	adoption	of	a	
careful	doctrinal	methodology	to	 identify	the	cases	 in	which	harsher	punishment	 is	said	to	be	
warranted	has,	ironically,	provided	sentencing	judges	with	the	tools	to	avoid	locating	instances	
of	offending	behaviour	 in	 the	Loveridge	 category.	Here,	 I	examine	how	judges	have	 found	and	
exploited	the	edges	of	the	category.	
	
Recognition	of	a	default	level	of	objective	seriousness	and	‘starting	point’	for	Loveridge	category	
crimes	was	apparent	in	R	v	Wood.	In	this	case,	the	intoxicated	offender	pushed	the	elderly	victim	
over	on	a	public	footpath,	causing	her	to	hit	her	head	on	the	concrete,	ultimately	leading	to	her	
death.	 This	 attack	 was	 random	 and	 unprovoked.	 The	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 NSWCCA	 in	 this	
sentencing	appeal	was	to	reaffirm	that	violence	+	public	+	intoxication	cases	carry	a	high	level	of	
objective	 seriousness	and	an	 additional	need	 for	 general	 deterrence	 (at	 [65]‐[66]).	 The	Court	
observed	 that,	 ‘[a]lthough	 it	 appears	 that	 his	 Honour	 acknowledged	 the	 principle	 of	 general	
deterrence	in	a	general	way	by	referring	to	s	3A	[of	the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	
(NSW)],	 the	 sentence,	 in	 our	 view,	 did	not	make	 any	 allowance	 for	 this	 significant	 sentencing	
principle	[emphasis	added]’	(at	[70]).	
	
However,	it	is	apparent	that	sentencing	judges	are	also	actively	scrutinising	the	facts	of	the	cases	
before	them	to	determine	whether	the	offender	does	fall	squarely	within	the	Loveridge	category.	
In	R	v	Lane	Campbell	J	found	that	the	case	was	one	that	involved	the	three	defining	elements	of	
the	category	(violence,	public	place,	intoxication):	
	
The	 features	of	 the	present	 case	which	 lead	me	 to	 conclude	 it	 is	 an	objectively	
serious	 one	 include	 that	 the	 crime	 was	 committed	 in	 a	 public	 place	 when	 the	
offender	was	very	intoxicated.	(at	[38])		
	
This	was	a	case,	therefore,	in	which	the	NSWCCA’s	‘emphatic	sentencing	response’	appeared	to	
be	warranted	(at	[69]).	However,	Campbell	J	then	went	on	to	consider	authority	that	might	justify	
a	departure	from	the	Loveridge	default	position:	
	
In	R	v	MD	[2005]	NSWCCA	342	…	the	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	said:	in	many	cases	
where	an	offender	is	convicted	of	manslaughter	there	will	be	exculpatory	matters	
and	personal	circumstances	that	can	lead	the	court	to	significantly	ameliorate	the	
sentence	which	might	otherwise	be	imposed.	(at	[70])	
Julia	Quilter:	Judicial	Responses	to	Alcohol‐Fuelled	Public	Violence:	The	Loveridge	Effect	
IJCJ&SD						138	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(3)	
Campbell	J	then	justified	deviation	from	the	default	level	of	objective	seriousness	associated	with	
the	Loveridge	category:	
	
This	 case	 is	 different	 from	 some	 other	 cases	 of	 drunken,	 public	 violence.	 The	
offender	did	not	single	out	an	unsuspecting	innocent	bystander	for	the	infliction	of	
gratuitous	violence.	Without	in	any	way	blaming	Mr	Morris	[the	victim]	for	what	
happened	there	does	seem	to	have	been	an	angry	exchange	of	words	between	two	
intoxicated,	middle‐aged	men,	each	of	whom	should	have	known	better.	Moreover,	
Mr	Morris	was	willing	 to	 grapple	with	 the	offender	 and	 initially	 seems	 to	 have	
obtained	 the	 upper	 hand.	 The	 offender’s	 culpability	 consists	 of	 escalating	 the	
violence	after	Mr	Morris	attempted	to	disengage	from	him.	
	
In	fixing	the	appropriate	sentence	for	this	offence	and	this	offender	I	bear	firmly	in	
mind	 the	 considerations	 of	 denunciation,	 punishment	 and	 general	 deterrence,	
which	call	for	the	emphatic	sentencing	response	discussed	in	Loveridge.	As	I	have	
tried	 to	 demonstrate,	 the	 subjective	 circumstances	 of	 the	 offender	 are	 in	 some	
respects	compelling.	(at	[79]‐[80])	
	
Although	it	involved	a	single	punch	leading	to	the	death	of	the	victim,	occurring	on	a	public	street,	
R	v	Dyer	was	a	case	that	had	various	differences	to	the	quintessential	Loveridge	category	case.	The	
offender	was	not	intoxicated,	the	offender	and	victim	were	both	homeless,	and	the	offender	was	
provoked	by	the	victim.	Once	again,	 the	Judge	started	with	the	case	of	Loveridge,	but	said	that	
‘because	of	the	differing	circumstances’	the	punishment	warranted	in	this	case	was	substantially	
reduced	(at	[23]).	The	Court	distinguished	this	case	from	the	Loveridge	category:	
	
Operating	in	the	Prisoner’s	favour	is	that	his	offence	was	not	one	of	alcohol	fuelled	
violence—one	 factor	 …	 which	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 recent	 emphasis	 on	 general	
deterrence.	 Also,	 he	 was	 subject	 to	 some	 provocation	 by	 the	 deceased	 in	
circumstances	 where	 their	 proximity	 was	 inspired	 by	 the	 Prisoner’s	 trying	 to	
assist	the	deceased.	(at	[24])	
	
The	fact	that	the	offence	was	not	alcohol‐related	and	was	subject	to	a	degree	of	provocation	were	
highlighted	for	the	purpose	of	justifying	deviation	from	the	level	of	objective	seriousness	linked	
with	Loveridge	category	cases.		
	
The	case	of	R	v	McNeil	(No	4)	is	perhaps	the	most	revealing	illustration	of	how	defence	counsel	
and	sentencing	judges	can	work	the	edges	of	the	category	created	by	the	NSWCCA	in	Loveridge	
by	 highlighting	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 characteristics	 said	 to	 warrant	 a	 greater	 emphasis	 on	
deterrence	and	a	higher	sentence.	This	is	especially	noteworthy	given	that,	like	Loveridge,	McNeil	
was	a	case	that	was	surrounded	by	intense	pre‐trial	publicity.	Indeed,	it	was	regarded	as	having	
striking	similarities	to	the	circumstance	of	Thomas	Kelly’s	death	in	2012	(including	because	the	
events	occurred	very	near	to	the	site	of	Kelly’s	death	and	were	reported	as	‘alcohol‐fuelled’	(see	
generally	Flynn,	Halsey	and	Lee	2016)).	In	McNeil	the	Court	said:	
	
I	accept	that	the	offender	was	not	in	Kings	Cross	on	New	Year’s	Eve	2013	looking	
for	trouble,	let	alone	that	he	had	any	intention	to	act	violently	towards	anyone.	In	
this	respect	the	case	is	quite	different	to	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120	which	
at	 first	 blush	might	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 strikingly	 similar	 case.	 The	 attack	upon	 the	
deceased	in	that	case	occurred	in	almost	the	exact	same	spot	as	the	attack	in	the	
present	case	and	 involved	a	single	punch	which	caused	death	by	an	 intoxicated	
offender.	But	in	that	case,	the	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	described	the	offender’s	
behaviour	(at	[168])	as	involving	the	 ‘repeated	and	random	selection	of	victims	
whom	he	attacked	to	the	head	in	a	public	street	for	no	reason’.		
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…	In	the	present	case,	the	offender	was	undoubtedly	intoxicated,	but	he	was	in	a	
buoyant	mood	 and,	 at	 a	 relatively	 early	 hour	 of	 the	 evening,	 he	was	 intent	 on	
leaving	Kings	Cross	and	going	home.	It	was	the	unexpected	interactions	with	the	
three	young	persons	at	the	intersection	of	Darlinghurst	Road	and	Victoria	Street	
that	 precipitated	 the	 sudden	 explosion	 of	 a	 violent	 response	 by	 the	 offender	
directed	towards	a	person	he	mistakenly	thought	was	part	of	the	same	group.	His	
action	was	reactive	to	the	immediately	preceding	events	rather	than	indicative	of	
him	acting	in	a	manner	that	was	premeditated.	(at	[27]‐[28])	
	
The	Court	 thus	sought	 to	distinguish	McNeil’s	 case	 from	that	of	Loveridge	by	emphasising	 the	
ways	in	which	the	events	did	not	qualify	as	a	Loveridge	category	crime,	citing	the	fact	that	it	did	
not	involve	repeated	and	random	attacks,	the	violence	was	not	gratuitous,	that	the	incident	was	
unexpected	in	that	the	three	youths	had	initiated	what	turned	into	a	physical	altercation	with	the	
offender,	and	the	final	punch	resulting	in	the	manslaughter	of	Daniel	Christie	was	induced	by	a	
mistaken	belief	(propelled	by	alcohol)	that	Christie	was	a	member	of	the	group	with	whom	McNeil	
had	just	had	a	physical	altercation.	In	these	circumstances,	a	head	sentence	less	than	the	14	years	
(prior	to	the	application	of	the	guilty	plea	discount)	set	by	the	NSWCCA	in	Loveridge	was	justified.		
	
In	R	v	McKnight	(No	4)	[2014]	NSWSC	1029,	the	Court	recognised	that	the	facts	involved	the	major	
Loveridge	category	characteristics.	General	deterrence	was	a	‘powerful	factor’	because:	
	
…	 the	 offending	 in	 this	 case	 consisted	 of	 an	 unprovoked	 attack	 upon	 an	
unsuspecting	and	vulnerable	member	of	the	public,	lawfully	present	on	a	public	
street	by	an	offender	intoxicated	by	too	much	alcohol	and	some	cannabis.	These	
considerations	bespeak	significant	objective	seriousness.	(at	[68])		
	
However,	 although	 the	 Court	 started	 the	 sentence	 calculation	 process	 at	 the	 default	 position	
endorsed	in	Loveridge,	it	did	not	end	there,	because	the	case	was	distinguished	by	the	offender’s	
mental	illness:		
	
However	 the	 difficulty	 in	 this	 particular	 case,	 as	 the	 Crown	 submissions	 also	
recognised,	is	the	part	played	by	the	offender’s	undoubted	psychiatric	illness.	This	
consideration	 distinguishes	 this	 case	 considerably	 from	 cases	 involving	
manslaughter	 by	 dangerous	 and	 unlawful	 act	where	 an	 offender	 has	 set	 out	 to	
either	wreak	havoc,	engage	in	affray	or	give	vent	to	a	violent	self‐gratification.	(at	
[71])		
	
The	need	for	emphatic	justice	in	the	present	case	must	be	ameliorated	to	a	degree	
by	the	offender’s	undoubted	psychiatric	illness.	(at	[73])	
	
McNeil	and	the	other	cases	discussed	here	show	that	sentencing	judges	have	not	simply	passively	
received	 and	deployed	 the	NSWCCA’s	 recalibration	of	 sentencing	practice	 in	 cases	of	 alcohol‐
related	 public	 violence.	 Consistent	 with	 principles	 of	 individualised	 justice,	 mindful	 of	 the	
potential	harshness	of	 too	 readily	 locating	a	 case	within	 the	Loveridge	 category,	 and	with	 the	
benefit	of	counsel	submissions,	judges	have	shown	a	willingness	to	distinguish	the	offences	and	
offenders	before	 them	 from	 the	 category	 of	 crimes	which	 the	NSWCCA	has	 ‘marked’	 as	more	
objectively	serious.	In	the	next	part	I	will	show	that,	nevertheless,	the	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal’s	
decision	has	had	a	significant	impact	on	sentencing	in	subsequent	matters.	
	
The	Loveridge	effect:	Impact	on	sentences	
The	 immediate	 objective	 of	 the	 NSWCCA	 in	 Loveridge	 [2014]	was	 to	 provide	 an	 appropriate	
sentence	for	the	offender,	but	the	manner	in	which	the	Court	went	about	this	task	made	it	clear	
that	a	wider	agenda	was	also	being	pursued.	Although	Loveridge	 [2014]	does	not	constitute	a	
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formal	 guideline	 judgment,18	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 Court	 was	 determined	 to	 put	 down	 some	
permanent	and	ongoing	 ‘markers’	 of	 general	 application—to	 influence	how	sentencing	courts	
should	approach	the	task	of	sentencing	violent	offenders	in	the	future.		
	
In	this	final	part	of	the	article,	I	consider	what	effect	the	NSWCCA’s	Loveridge	decision	has	had	on	
sentences	handed	down	in	cases	falling	within	what	I	have	called	the	Loveridge	category.	I	analyse	
nine	decisions	handed	down	in	NSW	between	July	2014	and	December	2015	(including	Loveridge	
[2014]).19		
	
Six	of	the	nine	cases	were	classic	one	punch	fatalities.20	Of	the	three	remaining	cases,	R	v	Lane21	
involved	a	grappling	between	the	offender	and	victim,	a	subsequent	exchange	of	blows	and	the	
final	deliverance	of	a	fatal	punch	by	the	offender;	R	v	Matthews	involved	a	series	of	punches	being	
exchanged	between	offender	and	victim	throughout	their	physical	altercation;	and	R	v	McKnight	
involved	three	forceful	kicks	to	the	victim’s	head	and	chest	area.	
	
Adopting	 a	 typology	 used	 in	 previous	 research	 (Quilter	 2014b),	 Table	 1	 summarises	 the	 key	
characteristics	of	cases	decided	since	Loveridge	[2014].	
	
Table	1:	‘Loveridge	category’	cases	in	NSW,	2014‐2015	
	
Case	
One	
punch	
Alcohol	
/drugs	
Guilty		
plea	
	
Sentence	
Public	
	location	
	
Stranger	
	
Unplanned	
Randomly	
	selected	
Provoked	
	(by	V)	
	
	
Loveridge	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
Y	
(25%)	
PGP:	14y	0m	
HS:	10y	6m	
NPP:	7y	0m	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
Dyer		
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
Y		
(15%)	
PGP:	7y	8m		
HS:	6y	6m	
NPP:	3y	9m	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Lambaditis		
	
	
			Y	
	
	
Y	
	
Y		
(25%)	
PGP:	12y	0m	
HS:	9y	0m	
NPP:	6y	9m	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
N	
	
	
Field	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
N	
PGP:		
HS:	10y	0m	
NPP:	7y	6m	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
Lane	
	
	
N	
	
	
Y	
	
Y		
(15%)	
PGP:	10y	0m	
HS:	8y	6m	
NPP:	6y	4m	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
Y	
	
	
McNeil	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
Y		
(25%)	
PGP:	12y	0m	
HS:	9y	0m	
NPP:	6y	9m	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
N	
	
	
Wood		
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
Y		
(5%)	
PGP:	12y	0m	
HS:	11y	4m		
NPP:	8y	0m	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
N	
	
	
Matthews		
	
	
N	
	
	
Y	
	
Y		
(25%0	
PGP:	10y	0m	
HS:	7y	6m	
NPP:	5y	0m	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
Y	
	
	
McKnight	
	
	
N	
	
	
Y	
	
Y		
(25%)	
PGP:	10y	8m		
HS:	8y	0m	
NPP:	6y	0m	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
Y	
	
	
N	
	
	
N	
	
Total/	
Average		
	
	
6	
	
	
7	
	
	
8	
PGP:	11y	0.5m		
HS:	8y	11m	
NPP:	6y	4m	
	
	
	9	
	
	
8	
	
	
9	
	
	
2	
	
	
3	
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Alcohol/drugs	
In	seven	of	the	nine	cases,	the	offender	was	affected	by	alcohol	or	drugs.22		
	
Gender	and	age	of	victim	and	offender		
In	all	but	one	case	(R	v	Wood),	both	the	offender	and	the	victim	were	male.	In	Wood,	the	victim	
was	an	elderly	woman	(71	years)	who	was	attacked	by	the	30‐year‐old	male	offender.		
	
The	mean	offender	age	was	33.84	years,	with	a	range	from	18	years	to	52.75	years	at	the	time	of	
offending.	That	is,	contrary	to	the	familiar	media	profile,	Loveridge‐style	fatal	assaults	were	not	
primarily	committed	by	youthful	men	but,	rather,	by	an	older	demographic.	
	
Randomness	
All	cases	involved	‘unplanned’	random	violence.	However,	in	only	two	cases	(including	Loveridge)	
could	it	be	said	that	the	victim	was	‘randomly	selected’	(see	R	v	Loveridge	[2014];	R	v	Field).		
	
Public	setting	
All	nine	of	 the	cases	occurred	 in	a	public	place,	with	 the	majority	 (seven)	occurring	 in	public	
streets.	Of	the	other	two,	one	occurred	on	a	public	footpath	(R	v	Wood)	and	the	other	in	an	open	
and	public	car‐park	(R	v	Field).		
	
Offender/victim	relationship	
Eight	of	nine	cases	occurred	in	circumstances	where	the	offender	and	the	victim	were	strangers.	
In	 the	 sole	 case	 where	 the	 offender	 and	 victim	 were	 not	 strangers	 (R	 v	 Matthews),	 their	
association	 was	 only	 through	 mutual	 friends—that	 is,	 they	 were	 not	 friends	 themselves	 but	
acquaintances.	In	only	three	of	the	nine	cases	was	there	some	provocation	by	the	victim.		
	
Plea	
In	 all	 nine	 cases	 the	 offender	 was	 originally	 charged	 with	 murder.	 In	 four	 of	 the	 cases,	 the	
Prosecution	accepted	a	plea	of	guilty	of	manslaughter.	 In	 four	other	cases,	 the	murder	charge	
went	to	trial,	and	the	accused	was	found	not	guilty	of	murder	but	guilty	of	manslaughter.	In	the	
final	case	(R	v	Matthews),	the	offender	was	initially	charged	with,	and	convicted	of,	murder.	On	
appeal	 the	 murder	 conviction	 was	 quashed,	 a	 retrial	 ordered	 and	 subsequently	 a	 plea	 of	
manslaughter	accepted.		
	
In	eight	cases	the	accused	pleaded	guilty	to	manslaughter	(including	the	four	cases	in	which	the	
Prosecution	declined	 to	 accept	 the	pleas	and	 the	murder	 charge	proceeded	 to	 trial),	with	 the	
majority	of	offenders	(five)	receiving	the	full	guilty	plea	discount	(25	per	cent).	In	only	one	case	
(R	v	Field)	was	a	guilty	plea	of	manslaughter	not	entered.	In	that	case,	the	offender	was	tried	for	
murder	but	ultimately	found	guilty	of	manslaughter.		
	
Remorse	and	rehabilitation	prospects	
In	 seven	 out	 of	 the	 nine	 cases,	 remorse	 was	 found,	 and	 in	 six	 of	 the	 nine	 cases,	 there	 were	
reasonable‐to‐good	prospects	of	rehabilitation.	
	
Sentences	
Table	1	 includes	 the	 sentences	handed	down	 in	each	of	 the	nine	cases.	Table	2	 compares	 the	
sentences	(head	sentence	and	NPP)	handed	down	in	the	post‐Loveridge	period	with	those	in	the	
pre‐Loveridge	period	(Quilter	2014b).23	
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Table	2:	Comparison	of	mean	and	median	sentences	pre‐	and	post‐Loveridge	
	 Mean	 Median	
Pre‐
Loveridge	
Post‐
Loveridge	
							
Increase	
Pre‐
Loveridge	
Post‐
Loveridge	
						
Increase	
Pre‐guilty	plea	reduction	 6y	10m	 11y	0.5m	 4y	2.5m	 7y	6m	 11y	4m	 3y	10m	
Head	sentence	 5y	2m	 8y	11m	 3y	9m	 5y	11m	 9y	0m	 3y	1m	
Non‐parole	period	 3y	2m	 6y	4m	 3y	2m	 3y	6m	 6y	9m	 3y	3m	
 
Table	2	shows	that,	after	Loveridge,	the	head	sentence	for	Loveridge	category	was,	on	average,	3	
years	and	9	months	higher,	and	the	median	increased	by	3	years	and	1	month.	In	terms	of	the	
NPP,	the	average	increase	since	Loveridge	was	3	years	and	2	months	whereas	the	median	increase	
was	3	years	and	3	months.	
	
Firm	 conclusions	 cannot	 be	 made	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 small	 number	 of	 cases	 decided	 in	 the	
immediate	aftermath	of	a	landmark	decision.	However,	the	data	summarised	here	show	that	the	
NSWCCA’s	decision	in	Loveridge	has	had	an	immediate	upward	effect	on	the	duration	of	both	head	
sentences	and	non‐parole	periods	 for	manslaughter	deaths	perpetrated	by	alcohol‐	and	drug‐
affected	men	in	public	during	the	course	of	spontaneous	and	unprovoked	attacks.		
	
Conclusion	
Five	years	on	from	the	tragedy	of	Thomas	Kelly’s	death	in	Kings	Cross	it	is	widely	recognised	that	
the	 legal	 landscape	has	changed	dramatically.	The	criminal	 law	now	supports	a	more	punitive	
response	 to	 fatal	 assaults	 that	 occur	 in	 public	 and	 are	 associated	with	 offender	 intoxication.	
Whether	to	praise	or	condemn,	most	observers	have	attributed	the	raising	of	the	penalty	bar	to	
the	NSW	Parliament,	because	it	enacted	a	new	offence	of	assault	causing	death	while	intoxicated,	
carrying	a	minimum	prison	term	of	8	years	(Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW),	ss	25A(2),	25B).	However,	
at	the	present	time,	that	would	be	a	misattribution.	Without	any	relevant	change	to	the	Crimes	Act	
1900	(NSW)	or	the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW),24	the	NSW	Court	of	Criminal	
Appeal	has	effectively	created	a	new	category	of	manslaughter	for	sentencing	purposes	via	its	
landmark	 Loveridge	 decision	 in	 2014.	 The	 Loveridge	 effect	 described	 in	 this	 article	 is	 that	
individuals	who	cause	the	death	of	another	person—through	violence	perpetrated	in	public	while	
intoxicated	 (especially	 if	 the	 victim	 was	 ‘innocent’	 and	 the	 attack	 ‘unprovoked’)—will	 be	
spending	a	substantially	longer	period	in	prison	than	those	who	perpetrated	similar	crimes	in	the	
past.		
	
On	the	one	hand,	legislatures	are	often	(and	appropriately)	criticised	for	making	major	changes	
to	the	criminal	 law	in	response	to	a	single	or	small	number	of	highly	publicised	tragic	crimes,	
which	 have	 wider	 and	 long‐term	 consequences,	 including	 the	 potential	 for	 injustice	 (Quilter	
2014a).	Such	was	the	case	with	the	decision	in	2014	of	the	NSW	Parliament	to	create	new	offences	
of	assault	causing	death,	and	assault	causing	death	while	intoxicated.	On	the	other	hand,	Courts	
in	 Australia	 are	 rarely	 subjected	 to	 scrutiny	 and	 criticism	 for	 contributing	 to	 increased	
punitiveness	 in	 criminal	punishment.	On	 the	contrary,	 they	are	more	 likely	 to	be	criticised	 for	
perceived	 leniency.	 This	 article	 has	 shown,	 however,	 that,	 to	 date,	 it	 is	 the	 judicial	 arm	 of	
government,	 rather	 than	 the	 legislative	 arm	 of	 government	 that	 has	 been	 responsible	 for	 a	
significant	movement	of	the	sentencing	needle	towards	longer	prison	terms	in	cases	of	alcohol‐
related	public	violence,	although	definitive	assessment	should	be	reserved	until	pending	charges	
and	sentences	under	s	25A	of	the	Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW)	are	finalised	in	the	courts.	
	
Whether	 the	 shift	 described	 here	 is	 a	 desirable	 one	 is	 a	moot	 point,	 and	will	 require	 further	
investigation	and	debate,	but,	in	closing,	I	make	four	observations.		
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First,	the	developments	described	in	this	article	should	prompt	re‐evaluation	of	the	conventional	
wisdom	that	it	is	elected	politicians	who	are	responsive	to	the	electorate	and	judges	who	are	‘out	
of	touch’.		
	
Secondly,	 unlike	 other	 manifestations	 of	 so‐called	 judicial	 ‘activism’,	 which	 are	 routinely	
criticised	 by	 politicians	 as	 ‘undemocratic’	 and	 illegitimate,	 the	 NSWCCA’s	 move	 to	 mandate	
tougher	sentences	 in	the	case	of	alcohol‐	and	drug‐related	public	violence	is	more	likely	to	be	
applauded	because	the	courts	are	seen	to	be	responding	to	the	same	community	anxieties	and	
attitudinal	 changes	 in	 society,	 and	 producing	 the	 same	 penal	 effects,	 as	 those	 which	 have	
dominated	government	rhetoric,	policy	and	legislative	reform	in	recent	years.		
	
Thirdly,	 in	 so	 doing,	 the	 courts	 appear	 to	 have	 endorsed	 the	 view,	 prominent	 in	 government	
policy	discourse,	that	alcohol‐	and	drug‐related	violence	inflicted	on	strangers	in	public	is	more	
objectively	serious	 than	violence	 that	occurs	 in	private	settings,	which	 frequently	 is	gendered	
domestic	violence	with	female	intimate	partners	as	victims	(McNamara	and	Quilter	2015;	Quilter	
et	al.	2016).	Neither	legislators	nor	judges	draw	the	distinction	in	such	stark	terms,	but	it	appears	
to	 be	 an	 inevitable	 consequence	 of	 treating	 ‘public	 location’	 and	 ‘randomness’	 as	 factors	 that	
increase	the	objective	seriousness	of	an	offence.		
	
Finally,	there	is	already	some	evidence	of	sentencing	judge	resistance	to	the	idea	that	an	incident	
that	 ostensibly	 falls	 with	 the	 Loveridge	 category	 necessarily	 warrants	 a	 longer	 prison	 term.	
Consistent	with	their	primary	obligation	to	administer	individualised	justice,	it	is	likely	that	some	
judges	will	continue	to	work	assiduously	to	find	the	edges	of	the	category,	consistent	with	their	
own	intuitive	assessment	of	where	the	offender	before	them	sits	on	the	spectrum	of	culpability.	
Indeed,	such	exercises	of	discretion	may	prove	to	be	an	important	release	valve	on	the	pressure	
towards	more	punitive	sentencing	that	the	NSWCCA	has	exerted	via	its	decision	in	Loveridge.		
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1248	at	[23];	R	v	Castle	[2012]	NSWSC	1603	at	[36].	
10	See	Hopley	v	The	Queen	[2008]	NSWCCA	105	at	[53];	R	v	Carroll	(2010)	77	NSWLR	45	at	[60];	Donaczy	v	R	[2010]	
NSWCCA	143	at	[53]‐[54].	
11	See	Adams	J	in	R	v	Greenhalgh	[2001]	NSWCCA	437	at	[13];	R	v	O’Hare	[2003]	NSWSC	652	at	[35]	and	[37].	
12	The	next	phase	in	the	larger	study	of	which	this	article	is	part	will	analyse	decisions	and	sentences	in	assault	causing	
death	cases	(s	25A),	several	of	which	are	currently	pending	in	the	NSW	courts.	
13	Although	in	R	v	Castle	[2012]	NSWSC	1603,	R	v	Greenhalgh	[2001]	NSWCCA	437	and	Hopley	v	R	[2008]	NSWCCA	105,	
there	was	no	specific	comment	made	in	relation	to	a	‘range’.	
14	See,	for	example,	R	v	Wood	[2014]	NSWCCA	184,	[55]‐[56],	[59];	R	v	Dyer	[2014]	NSWSC	1809,	[23];	Lambadatis	
[2015]	NSWSC	746,	 [99];	R	v	Field	 [2014]	NSWSC	1719,	 [91];	R	v	Lane	 (No	3)	 [2015]	NSWSC	118,	 [37];	 and	 the	
discussion	below	dealing	with	the	no	range	message	of	the	Loveridge	category.	
15	This	was	the	subject	of	multiple	references	by	the	Court:	see	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120	at	[101],	[103],	[105],	
[107],	[122],	[152],	[156],	[168],	[203],	[206],	[	207],	[209],	[209],	[210],	[212],	[213],	[216],	[219],	[234]	and	[267].		
16	This	was	the	subject	of	multiple	references	by	the	Court:	see	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120	at	[101],	[103],	[105],	
[107],	[122],	[156],	[168],	[206],	[208],	[209],	[210],	[212],	[213],	[216],	[219],	[269],	[275]	and	[281].	
17	This	was	the	subject	of	multiple	references	by	the	Court:	see	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120	at	[101],	[102],	[103],	
[105],	[107],	[120],	[122],	[204],	[210],	[216]	and	[218].	
18	As	noted	when	providing	the	background	of	the	article,	following	Loveridge’s	original	sentencing	in	November	2013,	
the	Office	of	the	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	announced	that,	in	addition	to	appealing	the	decision,	the	NSWCCA	
would	 be	 asked	 to	 hand	 down	 a	 formal	 guideline	 judgment	 in	 relation	 to	 cases	 of	 unlawful	 and	 dangerous	 act	
manslaughter	involving	death	caused	by	single	or	limited	punches	that	were	unprovoked,	random	and	gratuitous.	
This	course	of	action	was	later	abandoned	when,	in	January	2014,	the	NSW	Parliament	introduced	the	new	offences	
of	assault	causing	death	and	assault	causing	death	while	intoxicated	(Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW),	s	25A).	
19	The	9	cases	are:	R	v	Loveridge	[2014]	NSWCCA	120;	R	v	Wood	[2014]	NSWCCA	184;	R	v	Dyer	[2014]	NSWSC	1809;	R	
v	Lambaditis	[2015]	NSWSC	746;	R	v	Field	[2014]	NSWSC	1797;	R	v	Lane	(No	3)	[2015]	NSWSC	118;	R	v	McNeil	(No	
4)	[2015]	NSWSC	1198;	R	v	Matthews	[2015]	NSWSC	49;	R	v	McKnight	(No	4)	[2014]	NSWSC	1029.	It	is	noted	that,	in	
R	v	McKnight	(No	4)	[2014]	NSWSC	1029,	the	offender	was	suffering	from	delusional	schizophrenia	at	the	time	of	
offending,	which	created	an	internal	misconception	that	the	victim	had	stolen	from	him,	in	addition	to	the	presence	
of	 voices	 compelling	 the	 violence.	Although	 the	 judge	 noted	 that	 the	 need	 for	 general	 deterrence	 and	 ‘emphatic	
justice’	was	ameliorated	accordingly,	this	case	has	been	included	because	it	nonetheless	demonstrates	the	heightened	
severity	of	sentencing	by	the	judiciary	post‐Loveridge.	The	case	of	Matia	v	R;	R	v	Matia	[2015]	NSWCCA	79	has	been	
excluded	because	the	violent	conduct	occurred	in	the	context	of	excessive	self‐defence	which	consequently	renders	
the	factual	circumstances	and	the	subsequent	sentence	incomparable	with	the	other	cases.	
20	Of	these	six	I	note	R	v	Wood	[2014]	NSWCCA	184	involved	a	single	double‐handed	push	by	the	offender	to	the	elderly	
victim;	R	v	Dyer	[2014]	NSWSC	1809	involved	a	push‐and‐shove	prior	to	a	single	fatal	punch	being	thrown	by	the	
offender.	
21	It	is	noted	that	Lane’s	appeal	against	conviction	was	dismissed:	Lane	v	R	[2017]	NSWCCA	46.	
22	In	R	v	Field	[2014]	NSWSC	1719,	although	the	Court	recognised	that	the	offender	had	been	consuming	alcohol	for	a	
significant	period	of	time	prior	to	the	offence,	as	no	evidence	was	led,	intoxication	could	not	be	taken	into	account	in	
the	determination	of	sentence.		
23‘Pre‐Loveridge	period’	here	refers	to	the	cases	surveyed	in	Quilter	2014b,	being	NSW	sentencing	decisions	from	1998‐
2013	involving	one	punch	manslaughters.	While	it	is	not	claimed	that	the	post‐Loveridge	cases	are	identical	to	those	
reviewed	in	the	earlier	study,	there	are	sufficient	similarities	between	the	two	groups	of	cases—including	that	they	
are	primarily	one	punch	alcohol‐related	cases	originally	charged	as	murder,	but	in	which	a	plea	to	manslaughter	was	
accepted	(except	in	one	instance	in	both	groups)—that	comparison	is	valid	and	illuminating.	
24	Although	it	is	noted	that	the	special	rule	against	intoxication	being	a	mitigating	factor	was	introduced	in	2014	into	
the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW)	s	21A(5AA),	see	above.	
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